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Preemption

OCC v. Spitzer: An Erroneous Application of Chevron That Should Be Reversed
BY ARTHUR E. WILMARTH, JR.

Background of OCC v. Spitzer

I

n a recent article, Raymond Natter has accurately
described OCC v. Spitzer1 as a ‘‘sweeping decision’’
that affirms the power of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (‘‘OCC’’) to ‘‘bar State Attorneys
1
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency v. Spitzer, 396
F. Supp. 2d 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (‘‘OCC v. Spitzer’’).

Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Professor of Law at
George Washington University Law School, is
the author of numerous articles in the fields
of banking law and American legal history,
and co-author of a book on corporate law. He
has presented testimony before committees
of the U.S. Congress and the California legislature on bank regulatory issues and is a
member of the international editorial board of
the Journal of Banking Regulation, published
in London, England. Professor Wilmarth has
provided legal advice to state banking departments and the Conference of State Bank
Supervisors for more than 25 years. Prior to
joining the GWU faculty in 1986, Professor
Wilmarth was a partner in the Washington,
D.C., office of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue.

General from investigating or taking legal action
against national banks and their operating subsidiaries.’’2 In OCC v. Spitzer, a federal district court (the
‘‘District Court’’) upheld the validity of 12 C.F.R.
§ 7.4000, a regulation declaring that the OCC possesses
‘‘exclusive visitorial powers’’ over national banks.3 Visitorial powers include the right of a superior authority to
examine a bank and to enforce the bank’s compliance
with applicable laws.4 In upholding § 7.4000, the District Court determined that the OCC possesses exclusive governmental enforcement authority with respect
to all laws—federal and state—that apply to national
banks. Under the District Court’s decision, only the
OCC—not state officials—can file suit to enforce applicable state laws against national banks.
In 12 U.S.C. § 484(a), Congress has provided that
‘‘[n]o national bank shall be subject to any visitorial
powers except as authorized by Federal law, vested in
the courts of justice or such as shall be, or have been
exercised or directed by Congress . . . .’’5 In 2004, the
OCC amended 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000 to ‘‘clarify’’ the scope
2
Raymond Natter, OCC v. Spitzer: OCC’s Exclusive Authority over National Banks Affirmed, 81 BNA’S BANKING REP.
780, 780 (2005).
3
12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(a), (b).
4
See First Union National Bank v. Burke, 48 F. Supp. 2d
132, 144-45 (D. Conn. 1999).
5
12 U.S.C. § 484(a). A separate provision of § 484 allows
state officials to examine the records of national banks for the
sole purpose of ensuring compliance with state unclaimed
property or escheat laws. Id. § 484(b).
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of the ‘‘vested in the courts of justice’’ clause of 12
U.S.C. § 484(a).6 The OCC’s purpose in adopting the
2004 amendment was to ensure that
‘‘ . . . the exception for the courts of justice [in 12
U.S.C. § 484(a)] does not permit a State to use the
courts to inspect, examine, regulate or compel action by
a national bank. Instead, the exception simply permits
private litigants to obtain discovery and other typical judicial relief in actions involving national banks.7
Thus, the 2004 amendment, codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 7.4000(b)(2), embodies the OCC’s claim that judicial
proceedings brought by government officials to enforce
state laws against national banks are matters ‘‘within
the OCC’s exclusive purview.’’8
As Mr. Natter has explained, OCC v. Spitzer arose
out of ‘‘attempts by the New York State Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer, to investigate allegations that lending
institutions, including national banks, may have discriminated in the pricing of mortgage loans in violation
of New York law. . . . [T]he Attorney General sent letters to national banks demanding non-public lending
information as part of his ‘preliminary inquiry’ into potential lending discrimination violations.’’9
The OCC conceded that New York’s fair lending
laws, like other state antidiscrimination laws, apply to
residential mortgage loans made by national banks.10
Thus, the OCC did not dispute the applicability of New
York’s fair lending laws to the national banks that received Attorney General Spitzer’s requests for information.
The OCC also did not contest Attorney General
Spitzer’s authority under New York law to conduct investigations and initiate judicial proceedings to determine
whether lending institutions had violated New York’s
fair lending laws. However, the OCC maintained that
federal law preempted Attorney General Spitzer’s authority to investigate or bring judicial actions against
national banks.11

District Court’s Deference to OCC’s
‘Interpretation’ of 12 U.S.C. § 484(a)

The District Court granted the OCC’s motion for a
permanent injunction against Attorney General Spitzer.
In doing so, the District Court acknowledged that ‘‘nowhere does the [National Bank] Act precisely define the
scope of the OCC’s exclusive visitorial powers or the
reach of the courts of justice exception’’ in 12 U.S.C.

6
Bank Activities and Operations, 69 F.R. 1895 (2004)
(‘‘2004 OCC Visitorial Powers Rule’’), at 1895, 1900.
7
Natter, supra note 2, at 780 (emphasis added). See also
2004 OCC Visitorial Powers Rule, supra note 6, at 1900.
8
2004 OCC Visitorial Powers Rule, supra note 6, at 1900
(emphasis added).
9
Natter, supra note 2, at 780-81. As Mr. Natter also observed, ‘‘[t]he Attorney General’s concerns were based on preliminary and raw data released [by lending institutions] under
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, that showed that members
of certain minority groups were charged, on average, higher
mortgage rates than whites.’’ Id. at 780.
10
OCC v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 385; see also National
State Bank v. Long, 630 F.2d 981, 985-87 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that New Jersey’s anti-redlining statute applied to mortgage loans made by national banks); cf. Kroske v. US Bank
Corp., 432 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that Washington’s
statute prohibiting age discrimination in employment applied
to national banks).
11
See OCC v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 387-88.
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§ 484(a).12 Nevertheless, the District Court held that Attorney General Spitzer’s investigative and judicial enforcement powers were preempted with respect to national banks by § 484(a) as ‘‘interpreted’’ by the OCC in
12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(b)(2).13 Despite the lack of any explicit statutory mandate for the OCC’s regulation, the
District Court concluded that § 7.4000(b)(2) was entitled to ‘‘deference—indeed, controlling weight—under
the familiar framework set forth . . . in Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837
. . . (1984).’’14
Under ‘‘step one’’ of the Chevron framework, the District Court found that Congress had not addressed the
‘‘precise question at issue’’ that the OCC decided by issuing 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(b)(2). In the District Court’s
view, the National Bank Act did not ‘‘unambiguously’’
preclude the OCC from adopting a regulation that bars
state officials from initiating judicial enforcement proceedings against national banks.15
After concluding that Congress had not foreclosed
the OCC’s regulation, the District Court proceeded to a
highly deferential review of the OCC’s rule under ‘‘step
two’’ of Chevron. Applying ‘‘step two,’’ the District
Court concluded that the OCC’s regulation ‘‘reflects a
permissible construction of the statute’’ and should be
given ‘‘controlling weight’’ by the courts.16

Was District Court Correct in Granting Deference
to OCC’s Regulation?

Mr. Natter has justifiably described OCC v. Spitzer as
‘‘a significant victory for the OCC.’’17 However, in my
view the case was wrongly decided and should be reversed. As shown below, the District Court’s analysis
was fundamentally flawed, because 12 C.F.R.
§ 7.4000(b)(2) does not qualify for Chevron deference
and clearly exceeds the OCC’s statutory authority under the National Bank Act. The reasoning of the District
Court—and of three other federal courts that recently
upheld another OCC preemptive rule—suggests that the
OCC can rely on Chevron deference as a sufficient basis to expand its jurisdiction, and to alter the balance of
federal-state authority, without any clear expression of
supporting congressional intent. The Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Gonzalez v. Oregon,18 which rejected
a similar, open-ended claim for deference by the United
States Attorney General, makes clear that all four decisions are based on an erroneous understanding of
Chevron.
The first section of my analysis presents four reasons
why the District Court should not have granted Chevron deference to 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(b)(2).
12

Id. at 393.
Id. at 385, 407. For purposes of the District Court’s opinion, the term ‘‘national banks’’ includes operating subsidiaries
of national banks, based on a recent Second Circuit decision
that upheld another OCC preemptive rule, codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 7.4006. Under § 7.4006, the OCC has declared that state laws
apply to operating subsidiaries only to the extent that such
laws apply to national banks. OCC v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d
at 385 n.1 (citing Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305
(2d Cir. 2005), petition for cert. filed, No. 05-431 (U.S. Sept. 30,
2005)).
14
OCC v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 390 (quote), 404-07.
15
Id. at 393-94.
16
Id. at 399, 406.
17
Natter, supra note 2, at 782.
18
No. 04-623 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2006).
13
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First, the OCC’s regulation embodied a preemption
determination, and preemption determinations by federal agencies raise sensitive issues of federalism that require de novo review by the courts.
Second, the OCC’s regulation infringes upon the
states’ sovereign authority to enforce their laws and
thereby raises serious issues under the Tenth Amendment. The District Court should have refused to defer to
§ 7.4000(b)(2) under Chevron, because (i) the OCC’s
rule was not supported by any clear statement of congressional intent to divest the states of their sovereign
law enforcement authority, and (ii) the OCC’s claim for
Chevron deference must give way to the judicial canon
in favor of avoiding significant constitutional questions.
Third, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Gonzalez v.
Oregon shows that the District Court overlooked a crucial precondition for judicial deference under ‘‘step
two’’ of Chevron. That precondition—which I call
‘‘Chevron step 2.1’’—requires a reviewing court to determine whether a federal agency’s regulation has been
‘‘promulgated pursuant to authority Congress has delegated to the [agency].’’19 Under Gonzalez, it is not
proper for a court to grant deference ‘‘merely because
the statute is ambiguous.’’20 Rather, the court must
carefully examine the text and structure of the governing statute to determine whether it reveals a congressional intent to delegate the full extent of the rulemaking power claimed by the agency.
Gonzalez indicates that a searching analysis of congressional intent is particularly called for when the
agency asserts a ‘‘broad and unusual authority’’ based
on an ‘‘implicit delegation.’’21. In addition, the court
must keep in mind that Congress is unlikely to use
‘‘muffled hints’’ either to ‘‘alter a statute’s obvious
scope’’ or ‘‘to regulate areas traditionally supervised by
the States’ police power.’’22 When 12 C.F.R.
§ 7.4000(b)(2) is scrutinized under the standards articulated in Gonzalez, it becomes clear that the regulation
far exceeds the scope of the OCC’s authority under the
National Bank Act.
Fourth, the OCC was motivated by a powerful financial interest when it adopted § 7.4000(b)(2) in 2004, as
one of a series of preemption rules. The OCC’s preemption rules were designed to persuade large, multistate
banks to operate under national charters, thereby increasing the OCC’s assessment revenues and budgetary
resources. In view of the OCC’s obvious self-interest in
adopting § 7.4000(b)(2), the District Court should not
have given any deference to that regulation.
The remaining sections of my analysis demonstrate
that 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(b)(2) is contrary to the text and
history of 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) and related statutes, as
well as authoritative judicial constructions of the National Bank Act. The explicit language of 12 U.S.C.
§ 484(a) preserves, without any limitation, visitorial powers that are ‘‘vested in the courts of justice.’’ The ordinary meaning of the statutory text indicates a congressional intent to preserve the states’ ability to enforce
their laws through judicial proceedings. Nothing in the
clause’s unqualified terms, or in related statutes, suggests that Congress intended to restrict the availability

of judicial process to private litigants, as the OCC has
claimed.
Moreover, the OCC’s regulation is contrary to a long
series of judicial decisions. Since 1870, the Supreme
Court and other federal and state courts have repeatedly upheld the authority of state officials to obtain judicial remedies to enforce state laws against national
banks. In 1982, Congress reenacted the ‘‘vested in the
courts of justice’’ clause without change in 12 U.S.C.
§ 484(a), thereby indicating its presumptive agreement
with those court decisions.
In addition, the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (‘‘Riegle-Neal Act’’)
expressed Congress’ strong desire to maintain the balance between state and federal law which then existed
within the dual banking system. Thus, the position asserted by the OCC in § 7.4000(b)(2) is unsupported by
any congressional mandate and is contradicted by the
great weight of judicial authorities. Given the limited
scope of the OCC’s rulemaking power under 12 U.S.C.
§ 93a, the OCC had no authority to rewrite § 484(a) in
the guise of interpretation.

Analysis

1. The District Court Erred in Granting
Deference to 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(b)(2)
Under Chevron
a. Section 7.4000(b)(2) Is a Preemptive Rule and
Therefore Does Not Qualify for Judicial Deference Under Chevron. Section 7.4000(b)(2) is a preemptive regu-

lation that purports to bar state officials from suing in
either federal or state courts to enforce valid state laws
against national banks. In adopting § 7.4000(b)(2), the
OCC relied primarily on 12 U.S.C. § 484(a), which provides that ‘‘[n]o national bank shall be subject to any
visitorial power except as authorized by Federal law,
vested in the courts of justice or such as shall be, or have
been exercised by Congress . . . .’’23 On its face, the
‘‘vested in the courts of justice’’ clause exempts all visitorial powers exercised by federal and state courts from
the prohibition contained in 12 U.S.C. § 484(a). A
common-sense reading of § 484(a) would permit all judicial proceedings that are lawfully instituted against
national banks, including those initiated by state officials to enforce applicable state laws.

Thus, the OCC’s regulation should be rejected for the
same reason that the Supreme Court struck down the
United States Attorney General’s interpretive rule in
Gonzalez v. Oregon—namely, that the regulation conflicts with the ‘‘ordinary meaning’’ and ‘‘commonsense’’ application of the governing statute.24
As the District Court acknowledged in OCC v.
Spitzer, ‘‘nowhere does the [National Bank] Act define
the scope of the OCC’s exclusive visitorial powers or
the reach of the courts of justice exception.’’25 Hence,
the text of the National Bank Act does not place any
limitation on the visitorial powers that are ‘‘vested in
the courts of justice’’ under 12 U.S.C. § 484(a). Nevertheless, by adopting 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(b)(2), the OCC

19

Id., slip op. at 11.
Id.
21
Id., slip op. at 2, 20, 28.
22
Id., slip op. at 28.
20
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23

12 U.S.C. § 484(a) (emphasis added).
No. 04-623 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2006), slip op. at 27-28.
25
OCC v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 393.
24
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asserted that § 484(a) must be construed to preempt all
judicial enforcement proceedings brought by state officials, despite the absence of any specific language to
that effect in the statute itself.
The OCC’s preemption determination is not entitled
to deference, because the issue of whether a federal
statute preempts state law is a legal question as to
which courts have superior expertise, as well as an institutional responsibility to resolve sensitive issues involving the allocation of power under our federal system. Indeed, ‘‘the whole jurisprudence of pre-emption’’
is one of the important ways in which the judiciary ‘‘has
participated in maintaining the federal balance’’ between national and state authority.26
The Supreme Court has never ruled definitively on
the question of whether the Chevron doctrine applies to
preemption determinations by federal agencies. In
Chevron itself, the Supreme Court was not faced with
any preemption issue and considered only the question
of whether the federal agency’s interpretation was consistent with the governing federal statute.27
In Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A.,28 the Supreme Court confirmed that Chevron establishes an
‘‘ordinary rule of deference’’ to agency interpretations
of the meaning of a federal statute.29 However, on the
issue of whether Chevron applies to a federal agency’s
preemption determination, the Court assumed, without
deciding, that the question of a statute’s preemptive effect ‘‘must always be decided de novo by the courts.’’30
The Tenth Circuit had previously decided the issue left
unresolved in Smiley. The Tenth Circuit declared in
1991 that agency preemption determinations are not entitled to deference under Chevron, because such a determination ‘‘involves matters of law—an area more
within the expertise of the courts than within the expertise of the [agency].’’31

Recent Decisions Misapplied Chevron in
Upholding OCC’s Preemption Rules

In three recent decisions, the Second, Sixth and
Ninth Circuits granted deference under Chevron to another OCC regulation—12 C.F.R. § 7.4006, which preempts the states’ authority to regulate operating subsidiaries of national banks. However, all three decisions
failed to acknowledge Smiley or to consider whether
preemption determinations are so different in kind from
other agency interpretations that they do not qualify for
deference under Chevron.32 The Supreme Court re26
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995)
(Kennedy and O’Connor, JJ., concurring).
27
See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840. Similarly, in a decision that
granted Chevron deference to an OCC interpretive ruling, the
Supreme Court considered only the question of whether the
OCC’s ruling was consistent with federal statutes limiting the
powers of national banks. Nationsbank of N.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251 (1995) (‘‘VALIC’’). Thus, neither Chevron nor VALIC raised any preemption issues.
28
517 U.S. 735 (1996).
29
Id. at 740.
30
Id. at 743-44.
31
Colorado Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Harmon, 951 F.2d 1571,
1579 (10th Cir. 1991).
32
Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305, 315, 318-21
(2d Cir. 2005), petition for cert. filed, No. 05-431 (U.S., Sept.
30, 2005); Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Watters, 431 F.3d 556 (6th
Cir. 2005); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Boutris, 419 F.3d 949,
958-62 (9th Cir. 2005).
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cently indicated its interest in this issue when it invited
the Solicitor General to file a brief expressing the views
of the United States in response to Connecticut’s petition for certiorari in Wachovia v. Burke, requesting review of the Second Circuit’s decision.33
The Second, Sixth and Ninth Circuits also erred
when they refused to apply a presumption against preemption in determining whether the OCC had authority
to adopt its rule preempting state regulation of national
bank operating subsidiaries. A presumption against
preemption would have precluded Chevron deference
in all three cases, because such a presumption would
have required the OCC to show that 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006
was consistent with ‘‘the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.’’34
In Wachovia v. Burke, the Second Circuit concluded
that a presumption against preemption was inapplicable, because ‘‘[r]egulation of federally chartered
banks’’ is an area that has been ‘‘substantially occupied
by federal authority for an extended period of time.’’35
The Sixth and Ninth Circuits adopted the same view.36
Not surprisingly, the District Court in OCC v. Spitzer
followed Burke in rejecting any presumption against
preemption.37
The Second, Sixth and Ninth Circuits were clearly
mistaken in adopting such a narrowly restricted view of
the states’ role in regulating national banks. In its 1997
decision in Atherton v. FDIC,38 the Supreme Court affirmed that ‘‘federally chartered banks are subject to
state law.’’39 As support for that principle, the Court
cited decisions reaching back to an 1870 case, which
held that national banks
‘‘. . . are subject to the laws of the State, and are governed in their daily course of business far more by the
laws of the State than of the nation. All their contracts
are governed and construed by State laws. Their acquisition and transfer of property, their right to collect
their debts, and their liability to be sued for debts, are
all based on State law. It is only when State law incapacitates the [national] banks from discharging their
duties to the federal government that it becomes unconstitutional.’’40
33
See 74 U.S.L.W. 3334 (2005) (quoting the Supreme
Court’s order in Burke v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., No. 05-431
(U.S., Dec. 5, 2005)).
34
N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995) (quoting Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). For evidence that 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006 was not supported by any ‘‘clear
and manifest purpose of Congress,’’ see infra note 90 and accompanying text; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC’s Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency’s Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. REV. OF BANKING & FINANCIAL L. 225, 324-48 (2004).
35
Wachovia v. Burke, 414 F.3d at 314 (quoting Flagg v.
Yonkers Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 396 F.3d 178, 183 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 343 (2005)).
36
Wachovia v. Watters, 431 F.3d at 560 n.3 (quoting Flagg
and citing Bank of Am. v. City and County of San Francisco,
309 F.3d 551, 558 (9th Cir. 2002)); Boutris, 419 F.3d at 956 (citing Bank of Am.).
37
OCC v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 392.
38
519 U.S. 213 (1997).
39
Id. at 222 (emphasis added).
40
Id. at 222-23 (quoting National Bank v. Commonwealth
of Kentucky, 76 U.S (9 Wall.) 353, 362 (1870)).
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In its 1996 decision in Barnett Bank of Marion
County, N.A. v. Nelson,41 the Supreme Court held that
states have ‘‘the power to regulate national banks,
where . . . doing so does not prevent or significantly interfere with the national bank’s exercise of its powers.’’42 In 1999, when Congress enacted the GrammLeach-Bliley Act (‘‘GLBA’’),43 Congress adopted the
‘‘prevent or significantly interfere with’’ test as the governing standard for evaluating preemption claims based
on Barnett Bank with respect to insurance sales, solicitation or crossmarketing activities by national banks,
other depository institutions or their affiliates.44
In both Atherton45 and Barnett Bank,46 the Supreme
Court cited its earlier decision in Anderson National
Bank v. Luckett.47 In Luckett the Court declared that
‘‘national banks are subject to state laws unless those
laws infringe the national banking laws or impose an
undue burden on the performance of the banks’ functions.’’48 In two previous cases, the Court affirmed that
‘‘the operation of general state laws upon the dealings
and contracts of national banks’’ is the ‘‘rule’’, while
preemption is an ‘‘exception’’ that applies only when
state laws ‘‘expressly conflict with the laws of the
United States or frustrate the purpose for which national banks were created, or impair their efficiency to
discharge the duties imposed upon them by the law of
the United States.’’49

Presumption Against Preemption Should Be
Applied With Regard to State Laws Regulating
National Banks

All of the foregoing decisions of the Supreme Court
are consistent with the presumption against preemption
that the Court has applied in fields of traditional state
regulation.50 The Court has made clear that this presumption against preemption also applies when ‘‘the
field [of traditional state concern] is said to have been
pre-empted by an agency, acting pursuant to congressional delegation.’’51 In such a case, the federal agency
must show ‘‘a conflict between a particular [state-law]
provision and the federal scheme, that is strong enough
to overcome the presumption that state and local regulation . . . can constitutionally coexist with federal regulation.’’52
Congress expressed its support for the presumptive
application of state laws to national banks when it
passed the Riegle-Neal Act.53 The Riegle-Neal Act requires interstate branches of national banks to comply
with host state laws in four broadly-defined areas—
41

517 U.S. 25 (1996).
42
Id. at 33.
43
Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338.
44
See 15 U.S.C. § 6701(d)(2)(A); H.R. Rep. No. 106-434, at
156-57 (1999) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1999 U.S.C.C.A.N.
245, 251.
45
519 U.S. at 223
46
517 U.S. at 33.
47
321 U.S. 233 (1944).
48
Id. at 248.
49
First National Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640,
656 (1924); McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U.S. 347, 357 (1896).
50
E.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475, 484-85
(1996); Blue Cross, 514 U.S. at 654-56 (1995).
51
Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1985).
52
Id. at 716.
53
Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338.
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community reinvestment, consumer protection, fair
lending and intrastate branching—unless federal law
preempts the application of state law to national banks.
12 U.S.C. § 36(f)(1)(A). In explaining why state laws
should generally apply to national banks, the conference report on the Riegle-Neal Act declared:
‘‘States have a strong interest in the activities and operations of depository institutions doing business
within their jurisdictions, regardless of the type of charter an institution holds. In particular, States have a legitimate interest in protecting the rights of their consumers, businesses and communities . . . .
‘‘Under well-established judicial principles, national
banks are subject to State law in many significant respects . . . . Courts generally use a rule of construction
that avoids finding a conflict between the Federal and
State law where possible. The [Riegle-Neal Act] does not
change these judicially established principles.’’54
By referring to ‘‘judicially established principles’’ under which ‘‘national banks are subject to State law in
many significant respects,’’ the Riegle-Neal conferees
clearly indicated their agreement with the Supreme
Court decisions discussed above. Indeed, Congress has
long followed a policy favoring the general application
of state laws to national banks, in order to maintain a
competitive equilibrium within the dual banking system
of national and state banks.55
The clear error underlying the refusal of the Second
and Ninth Circuits to apply a presumption against preemption is shown by their misplaced reliance on United
States v. Locke.56 In Locke, the Supreme Court declined to apply a presumption against preemption in
striking down state laws that imposed restrictions on oil
tankers operating in navigable waterways. The Court
emphasized that the challenged state laws sought to
regulate ‘‘national and international maritime commerce,’’ an area in which Congress had shown a strong
desire to establish a ‘‘uniformity of regulation.’’57 By
contrast, in Atherton, after reviewing the long history of
state regulation of national banks, the Supreme Court
held that federal policy did not require any ‘‘uniformity’’
of regulatory treatment for federally-chartered banks.58
Thus, the rejection of a presumption against preemption by the Second, Sixth and Ninth Circuits finds no
support in Locke and is plainly inconsistent with the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Atherton, Luckett, St.
Louis, and McClellan, as well as the Riegle-Neal conference report. In a recent decision, Kroske v. US Bank
54
H.R. Rep. No. 103-651, at 53 (1994) (Conf. Rep.) (emphasis added), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2068, 2074.
55
See Wilmarth, supra note 34, at 257 (stating that ‘‘Congress has followed a ‘policy of equalization’ designed to maintain a basic parity of competitive opportunities between national and state banks’’) (quoting First National Bank of Logan
v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 261 (1966), and
Lewis v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 292 U.S. 559, 564-66 (1934));
see also id. at 266 (explaining that Congress has carried out
‘‘its general policy of maintaining a competitive balance in the
dual banking system’’ in two ways—first, by ‘‘expressly incorporating state-law standards’’ into federal statutes, and second, ‘‘through statutory silence’’ that allows state laws to apply to national banks except in situations where a state law
creates an ‘‘irreconcilable conflict with federal law’’).
56
529 U.S. 89 (2000). See Wachovia v. Burke, 414 F.3d at
314 (citing Locke); Bank of Am., 309 F.3d at 558 (same).
57
Locke, 529 U.S. at 108.
58
Atherton, 519 U.S. at 219-26.
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Corp.,59 the Ninth Circuit appears to have retreated
somewhat from its position in Wells Fargo v. Boutris. In
Kroske the Ninth Circuit applied a presumption against
preemption in determining that a national bank must
comply with a Washington statute prohibiting age discrimination in employment. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Washington statute was consistent with
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (‘‘ADEA’’),
a federal statute which creates a ‘‘cooperative statefederal anti-discrimination scheme’’ allowing for
supplemental state regulation and enforcement.60
The national bank in Kroske argued that the Washington statute was preempted by 12 U.S.C. § 24(Fifth),
which allows national bank directors to dismiss bank
officers ‘‘at pleasure.’’ However, the Ninth Circuit
held—in view of the ADEA’s status as a more recent
federal statute—that § 24(Fifth) does not prevent national bank officers from asserting state-law claims that
are consistent with the ADEA.61

Existence of Preemptive Agency Rule Should Not
Remove Presumption Against Preemption

Kroske was different from Boutris in one important
respect. The OCC has not issued any regulation interpreting the meaning or scope of the ‘‘dismiss . . . at
pleasure’’ language in 12 U.S.C. § 24(Fifth). Therefore,
the national bank in Kroske—unlike the national bank
in Boutris—could not argue that the Ninth Circuit
should give Chevron deference to an OCC rule asserting that the National Bank Act preempts state law. As a
consequence, the national bank in Kroske bore the burden of proof in establishing that federal law preempted
the Washington age discrimination statute, while the
state official in Boutris effectively bore the burden of
proof in showing that the OCC’s regulation was unauthorized.
It is unreasonable—and inconsistent with traditional
concepts of federalism—for a court to shift the burden
of proof in a preemption case simply because a federal
agency has issued a regulation that allegedly preempts
state law. As noted above, the Supreme Court’s decision
in Hillsborough County supports the view that the same
presumption against preemption should apply whether
the source for the alleged preemption is a statute or an
agency rule.62
In Kroske the Ninth Circuit applied a presumption
against preemption based on its explicit recognition of
both ‘‘the State’s historic police powers to prohibit discrimination on specified grounds’’ and ‘‘the historic
dual regulation of [national] banks by state and federal
law.’’63 As discussed above, those factors are also
present in OCC v. Spitzer.64 Moreover, Kroske agrees
with decisions of several other lower federal courts and
state courts, which have applied a presumption against
59

432 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 985 (quote), 987-88.
61
Id. at 985-89 (concluding that the ‘‘dismiss . . . at pleasure’’ provision of 12 U.S.C. § 24(Fifth) was repealed by implication to the extent that it conflicted with the later-enacted
ADEA).
62
See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text (discussing Hillsborough County).
63
Id. at 981-82.
64
See supra note 10 and accompanying text (noting the
OCC’s concession that New York’s fair lending laws apply to
mortgage loans made by national banks).
60
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preemption in affirming the applicability of state laws to
national banks.65
The District Court therefore erred in OCC v. Spitzer
when it rejected a presumption against preemption.
Proper application of the presumption would have precluded Chevron deference and would have required a
decision striking down 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(b)(2), because Congress has never expressed a ‘‘clear and manifest purpose’’ to bar the states from bringing judicial
enforcement proceedings against national banks.66 As
discussed below, the text and history of 12 U.S.C.
§ 484(a) and related statutes demonstrate Congress’
clear understanding that the states do have authority to
seek judicial remedies to enforce applicable state laws
against national banks.

b. Section 7.4000(b)(2) Infringes upon the States’
Sovereign Authority to Enforce Their Laws. Section

7.4000(b)(2) unlawfully interferes with the sovereign
authority of each state to enforce its laws. The Supreme
Court has made clear that the ability of each state to enforce its laws is a crucial aspect of its sovereignty. In
Heath v. Alabama,67 the Court declared that ‘‘[a]
State’s interest in vindicating its sovereign authority
through enforcement of its laws by definition can never be
satisfied by another State’s enforcement of its own
laws.’’68
Similarly, in Butkus v. Illinois,69 the Court held that a
federal prosecution could not deprive a state of its sovereign authority to enforce its criminal code, because
such a result ‘‘would be in derogation of our federal system’’ and would constitute ‘‘a shocking and untoward
deprivation of the historic right and obligation of the
States to maintain peace and order within their confines.’’70
In United States v. Wheeler,71 the Supreme Court declared that ‘‘[e]ach [state] has the power, inherent in any
sovereign, independently to determine what shall be an
offense against its authority and to punish such offenses.’’72 Similarly, in Heath and United States v.
Lanza,73 the Court explained that the states’ authority
to make and enforce laws derives from powers ‘‘originally belonging to [the states] before admission to the
Union and preserved to them by the Tenth Amendment.’’74
In subsequent decisions, which limited the authority
of federal courts to review state court convictions in
criminal cases, the Supreme Court emphasized the
close connection between a state’s lawmaking and law
65
E.g., National State Bank v. Long, 630 F.2d 981, 985 (3d
Cir. 1980); Video Trax, Inc. v. NationsBank, 33 F. Supp. 2d
1041, 1048 (S.D. Fla. 1998), aff’d, 205 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 822 (2000); Perdue v. Crocker
National Bank, 702 P.2d 503, 519-23 (Cal. 1985), appeal
dism’d, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986); Peatros v. Bank of Am., NT &
SA, 990 P.2d 539, 542-43 (Cal. 2000); North Dakota v. Liberty
National Bank & Trust Co., 427 N.W.2d 307, 309-10, 314-15
(N.D. 1988).
66
Blue Cross, 514 U.S. at 655 (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at
230).
67
474 U.S. 82 (1985).
68
Id. at 93 (emphasis added).
69
359 U.S. 121 (1959).
70
Id. at 137.
71
435 U.S. 313 (1978).
72
Id. at 320 (emphasis added).
73
260 U.S. 377 (1922).
74
Heath, 474 U.S. at 89 (emphasis added); accord, Lanza,
260 U.S. at 382.
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enforcement powers. The Court declared: ‘‘Our federal
system recognizes the independent power of a State to
articulate societal norms through criminal law; but the
power of a State to pass laws means little if the State cannot enforce them.’’75
As the Supreme Court explained in Wheeler, federal
preemption of a state’s authority to enforce its criminal
code ‘‘would trench upon important state interests’’ and
would ignore the ‘‘settled ‘dual sovereignty’ concept’’
that applies in the field of law enforcement.76 Likewise,
in St. Louis the Court emphatically rejected the claim—
asserted both by a national bank and by the United
States as amici curiae—that federal officials possessed
exclusive authority to institute judicial proceedings
against a national bank for a violation of state law.77
The Court declared:
‘‘The state statute as applied to national banks is. . . valid, and the corollary that it is obligatory and enforceable necessarily results, unless some controlling
reason forbids; and since the sanction behind it is that of
the State and not that of the National Government, the
power of enforcement must rest with the former and not
with the latter. To demonstrate the binding quality of a
statute but deny the power of enforcement involves a
fallacy made apparent by the mere statement of the
proposition, for such a power is essentially inherent in the
very conception of law.’’78
In First Union National Bank v. Burke,79 the district
court held that the OCC had exclusive authority ‘‘to directly enforce state banking law against national banks
through administrative orders.’’80 However, the court
confirmed that ‘‘a state may seek enforcement of its
state banking laws in either federal or state court’’ under
the ‘‘vested in the courts of justice’’ clause of 12 U.S.C.
§ 484(a).81 The court rejected the Connecticut Banking
Commissioner’s argument that the Tenth Amendment
precluded the OCC from exercising exclusive administrative enforcement authority with regard to state laws.
At the same time, the court emphasized that § 484(a)
‘‘expressly leaves available judicial remedies [allowing
state officials] to compel national bank compliance with
state law.’’82 The court’s opinion clearly suggests that
the court would have perceived a serious Tenth Amendment issue if the OCC had sought to bar state officials
from seeking ‘‘judicial remedies’’ to enforce applicable
state laws against national banks.83

District Court Ignored States’ Sovereign Law
Enforcement Authority

In OCC v. Spitzer the District Court should not have
deferred to § 7.4000(b)(2) under Chevron, because that
regulation infringes upon the states’ sovereign law en-

75
Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 557, 566 (1998) (quoting
McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991)).
76
Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 332.
77
See St. Louis, 263 U.S. at 643 (argument by counsel for
national bank); id. at 645-48 (argument for the Solicitor General on behalf of the United States as amici curaie).
78
Id. at 659-60 (emphasis added).
79
48 F. Supp. 2d 132 (D. Conn. 1999),
80
Id. at 149 (emphasis added).
81
Id. at 146 (emphasis added).
82
Id. at 148-49 (emphasis added).
83
See id. at 150-51 (explaining that ‘‘[t]his order in no way
precludes . . . the [Connecticut Banking] Commissioner from
seeking enforcement of this state banking statute against the
plaintiff national bank though the courts’’) (emphasis added).
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forcement powers, preserved by the Tenth Amendment.
Section 7.4000(b)(2) seeks to preempt all authority of
the states to enforce their laws against national banks
through judicial proceedings.
The OCC has removed any doubt as to the sweep of
its regulation by proclaiming that any decision on
whether to enforce an applicable state law against a national bank is a matter that falls ‘‘within the OCC’s exclusive purview.’’84 The OCC’s exercise of discretion in
deciding whether to enforce a particular state law
against a national bank would be ‘‘presumed immune
from judicial review’’ under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2), because enforcement decisions are ‘‘generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion.’’85 If 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(b)(2) is upheld,
it would be extremely difficult for state officials to obtain judicial review of refusals by the OCC to enforce
applicable state laws against national banks. Consequently, § 7.4000(b)(2) severely impairs the states’ sovereign authority to prevent violations of their laws by
national banks.
In an analogous case, the Supreme Court refused to
defer to a federal agency’s rule, because the rule applied the governing federal statute in an aggressive
manner that created ‘‘significant constitutional and federalism questions.’’86 The Court concluded that the
agency’s position ‘‘alter[ed] the federal-state framework by permitting federal encroachment upon a traditional state power,’’ and the agency could not show ‘‘a
clear indication that Congress intended that result.’’87
In the absence of any clear statement of congressional intent, the District Court should not have allowed
the OCC to issue a regulation infringing upon the states’
traditional law enforcement powers. Given the serious
Tenth Amendment issues raised by the regulation, ‘‘the
constitutional avoidance canon of statutory interpretation trumps Chevron deference.’’88

c. The District Court Improperly Applied ‘‘Step
Two’’ of Chevron. In OCC v. Spitzer, the District Court

apparently viewed the absence of a federal statute prohibiting the OCC’s regulation as a sufficient basis for its
decision (i) to reject New York’s challenge to the regulation’s validity under ‘‘step one’’ of Chevron, and (ii) to
proceed to a highly deferential review of the regulation
under ‘‘step two’’ of Chevron.89
In practical effect, the District Court’s application of
Chevron would give the OCC an unlimited authority to
84
2004 OCC Visitorial Powers Rule, supra note 6, at 1900
(emphasis added).
85
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-32 (1985); see also
Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Collins, 359 F.3d 156, 164-66 (2d Cir.
2004).
86
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001).
87
Id. at 172-73.
88
University of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335, 1340-41
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (refusing to defer to an agency regulation that
raised serious constitutional questions under the First Amendment). See also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562
(1995) (declaring that ‘‘this Court will construe a statute in a
manner that requires decision of serious constitutional questions only if the statutory language leaves no reasonable alternative’’).
89
See id. OCC v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d—at 393-94 (finding no reason to conclude that ‘‘the statute unambiguously
contravenes the OCC’s interpretation as reflected in 12 C.F.R.
§ 7.4000’’).
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issue rules preempting state law except in areas where
Congress affirmatively barred such regulations by unambiguous statutory language. The Second, Sixth and
Ninth Circuits applied similar reasoning in upholding
12 C.F.R. § 7.4006. All three courts granted deference
under ‘‘step two’’ of Chevron after concluding that Congress did not express a ‘‘manifest’’ or ‘‘unambiguous’’
intent to prohibit the OCC from adopting its rule preempting the states’ authority to regulate operating subsidiaries of national banks.90
The foregoing decisions are clearly erroneous in view
of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Gonzalez v.
Oregon.91 In Gonzalez, the Court declared that ‘‘Chevron deference . . . is not accorded merely because the
statute is ambiguous and an administrative [agency] is
involved.’’92 Rather, deference is appropriate under
‘‘step two’’ of Chevron only if a federal agency’s regulation is ‘‘promulgated pursuant to authority Congress
has delegated to the [agency].’’93
Moreover, Gonzalez indicates that a reviewing court
should be skeptical when an agency claims ‘‘broad and
unusual authority through an implicit delegation’’ that
is allegedly derived from ‘‘vague terms or ancillary provisions’’ in the governing statute.94 In such a case, the
reviewing court may properly conclude that ‘‘Congress
could not have intended to delegate a decision of such
economic and political significance to an agency in so
cryptic a fashion.’’95

The Need for a ‘Chevron Step 2.1’ Test

Gonzalez makes clear that statutory silence or ambiguity is not a sufficient basis for granting deference under ‘‘step two’’ of Chevron. Before a reviewing court
may defer to an agency regulation under ‘‘step two,’’
the court must first perform an analysis that I call
‘‘Chevron step 2.1.’’ Under this ‘‘step 2.1,’’ the court
must carefully consider whether Congress has authorized the agency to adopt a regulation to clarify the ambiguity or to fill the ‘‘gap’’ that the agency has identified
in the governing statute.
Only if the court answers ‘‘yes’’ at ‘‘step 2.1’’ may the
court then proceed to a more deferential analysis of
whether the agency has made a ‘‘reasonable’’ interpretation of the statute.96 In addition, if the agency adopts
an ‘‘interpretation’’ of a statute that significantly ex90
See Wachovia v. Burke, 414 F.3d at 317-18 (finding ‘‘no
manifest congressional intent to preclude the OCC regulations
in this case’’ because ‘‘no [federal] statute speaks directly to
the scope of federal versus state power over [operating subsidiaries]’’); Wachovia v. Watters, 431 F.3d at 561-62 (concluding
that ‘‘Congress has not spoken precisely on the issue’’ because
the ‘‘absence of any [statutory] reference’’ to the allocation of
federal and state authority over operating subsidiaries ‘‘does
not convey the unambiguous intent of Congress’’); Wells Fargo
v. Boutris, 419 F.3d at 961 (stating that the National Bank Act
‘‘is silent as to the OCC’s authority to regulate operating subsidiaries’’).
91
No. 04-623 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2006).
92
Id., slip op. at 11.
93
Id.
94
Id., slip op. at 20.
95
Id., slip op. at 21 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
96
See id.; see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
218, 229 (2001) (explaining that deference under ‘‘step two’’ of
Chevron is appropriate if it is ‘‘apparent from the agency’s
generally conferred authority and other statutory circumstances that Congress would expect the agency to be able to
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pands the agency’s jurisdiction or encroaches upon an
area traditionally regulated by the states, the reviewing
court should require a clear showing that the agency’s
‘‘interpretation’’ is consistent with the available evidence of Congress’ intent.97
In Gonzalez, the Supreme Court struck down an interpretive rule issued by the United States Attorney
General. In that rule, the Attorney General declared
that physicians prescribing controlled substances for
assisted suicides were not engaged in legitimate medical practice, regardless of state law to the contrary, and
were subject to civil and criminal sanctions under federal law. The Supreme Court observed that the federal
Controlled Substances Act (‘‘CSA’’) prohibits doctors
from using drug prescriptions ‘‘as a means to engage in
illicit drug dealing and trafficking as conventionally understood.’’98 However, the Court determined that the
CSA ‘‘manifests no intent to regulate the practice of
medicine generally’’ and, instead, indicates a congressional purpose to ‘‘rely upon a functioning medical profession regulated under the States’ police powers.’’99
The Court therefore invalidated the Attorney General’s
rule, because (i) the Attorney General’s claim of authority would ‘‘effect a radical shift of authority from the
States to the Federal Government to define general
standards of medical practice in every locality,’’ and (ii)
the ‘‘text and structure of the CSA show that Congress
did not have this far-reaching intent to alter the federalstate balance and the congressional role in maintaining
it.’’100
The District of Columbia Circuit followed a similar
line of reasoning in a recent decision that refused to
give Chevron deference to a ruling of the Federal Trade
Commission (‘‘FTC’’).101 The FTC’s ruling sought to
classify attorneys as ‘‘financial institutions’’ for purposes of Title V of GLBA—a classification that would require attorneys to comply with Title V’s customer privacy provisions.102 The D.C. Circuit found that the
FTC’s ‘‘attempted turf expansion’’ would enable the
FTC to ‘‘extend its regulatory authority over attorneys
engaged in the practice of law,’’ even though ‘‘the regulation of the practice of law is traditionally the province
of the states.’’103 In concluding that the FTC’s ruling did
not qualify for Chevron deference, the court emphasized:
‘‘Federal law may not be interpreted to reach into areas of State sovereignty unless the language of the federal
law compels the intrusion . . . . Otherwise put, if Congress
intends to alter the usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government, it must
make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.’’104
The court concluded that the FTC had no authority to
issue its ruling, because ‘‘Congress has not made an inspeak with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the
statute or fills a space in the enacted law’’).
97
See Gonzalez v. Oregon, No. 04-623 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2006),
slip op. at 20-21, 24-25, 28.
98
Id., slip op. at 23.
99
Id.
100
Id., slip op. at 28.
101
Am. Bar Ass’n v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(‘‘ABA v. FTC’’).
102
See id. at 465-66.
103
Id. at 467, 468, 471-72.
104
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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tention to regulate the practice of law ‘unmistakably
clear’ in the language of the GLBA.’’105
Like the Supreme Court in Gonzalez v. Oregon, the
D.C. Circuit repudiated the notion that Chevron allows
a federal agency to issue rules in any area over which it
has arguable jurisdiction, so long as Congress has not
enacted a statute that expressly forbids the agency’s action. The D.C. Circuit specifically rejected the FTC’s
suggestion that a federal agency is entitled to highly
deferential review under ‘‘Chevron step two . . . any
time a [federal] statute does not expressly negate the
existence of a claimed administrative power.’’106 The
D.C. Circuit declared that such an application of Chevron would be ‘‘ ‘flatly unfaithful to the principles of administrative law . . . and refuted by precedent.’ . . . Plainly, if
we were ‘to presume a delegation of power from the absence of an express withholding of such power, agencies
would enjoy virtually limitless hegemony . . . .’ ’’107
In view of Gonzalez v. Oregon and ABA v. FTC, the
District Court clearly erred in OCC v. Spitzer when it
deferred to 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(b)(2) under ‘‘step two’’ of
Chevron. The District Court improperly proceeded to
‘‘step two’’ based on its finding that the National Bank
Act did not ‘‘unambiguously’’ foreclose the OCC’s regulation.108 As shown above, however, the OCC’s regulation entrenches upon the states’ sovereign law enforcement powers. Moreover, the OCC cannot point to any
‘‘unmistakably clear’’ expression of a congressional intent to prohibit the states from enforcing their laws by
means of judicial proceedings against national
banks.109
The unqualified exemption provided by § 484(a) for
visitorial powers ‘‘vested in the courts of justice’’ indicates that Congress did not intend to bar state officials
from bringing judicial enforcement proceedings.110 As
demonstrated below, the plain meaning of the ‘‘vested
in the courts of justice’’ clause is supported by related
statutes and judicial opinions. In light of all these factors, the OCC’s extraordinary claim of authority to issue
a regulation overriding a sovereign state power does not
qualify for deference under Chevron and should be rejected.

d. Section 7.4000(b)(2) Is Not Entitled to Deference in View of the OCC’s Strong Self-Interest in
Adopting the Rule There is an additional reason to

deny Chevron deference to 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(b)(2). In
recent years, the OCC has proclaimed that preemption
of state law ‘‘is a significant benefit of the national
charter—a benefit that the OCC has fought hard over
the years to preserve.’’ In the OCC’s view, a ‘‘major ad105

Id.
ABA v. FTC, 457 F.3d at 468 (quoting Ry. Labor Exec.
Ass’n v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(emphasis in original)).
107
Id. (emphasis added in part) (quoting Ry. Labor Exec.
Ass’n, 29 F.3d at 671).
108
OCC v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 393-94.
109
See ABA v. FTC, 430 F.3d at 471-72 (declaring that ‘‘Federal law may not be interpreted to reach into areas of State
sovereignty’’ without an ‘‘unmistakably clear’’ statement of
congressional intent).
110
As noted above, the District Court acknowledged in
OCC v. Spitzer that ‘‘nowhere does the [National Bank] Act
precisely define the scope of the OCC’s exclusive visitorial
powers or the reach of the courts of justice exception.’’ 396
F. Supp. 2d at 393.
106
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vantage of the national charter’’ is created by the OCC’s
efforts to provide a regime that will enable national
banks ‘‘to conduct a multistate business subject to a
single uniform set of federal laws, under the supervision of a single regulator, free from visitorial powers of
various state authorities.’’111
In a newspaper interview published in 2002, Comptroller of the Currency John D. Hawke, Jr. acknowledged that the OCC’s preemption of state consumer
laws and state visitorial authority ‘‘provides an incentive for banks to sign up with the OCC . . . . ‘It is one of
the advantages of a national charter, and I’m not the
least bit ashamed to promote it.’ ’’112
Many of the largest national banks publicly supported the OCC’s decision in January 2004 to adopt
§ 7.4000(b)(2) and to promulgate additional preemption
rules. Commentators generally viewed those rules as
serving the interests of big banks with extensive interstate operations.113 In response to the OCC’s aggressive
preemption campaign, several large, multistate banks
converted from state to national charters.114 As a result
of those conversions, the portion of the nation’s commercial banking assets held by state-chartered banks
fell from about 40 percent in 2003 to just over 30 percent in 2005.115 In September 2005, FDIC Chairman
Donald E. Powell described the impact of the OCC’s
‘‘sweeping’’ preemption rules in the following terms:
‘‘[T[he dual banking system is at a crossroads. The
share of banking activity conducted through statechartered banks is dwindling and there is every reason
to believe that trend will continue. The issue goes well
beyond market share, to fundamental issues about competitive fairness and states’ ability to enforce laws protecting consumers. . . .
‘‘The facts of life today with regard to preemption are
fairly simple. A state-chartered bank that wants to do
business across state lines is at a substantial disadvantage relative to a national bank . . . .’’116

OCC’s Financial Motivation for Adopting Its
Preemption Rules

The OCC has a powerful motivation to persuade large
banks to operate under national charters. Virtually all
of the OCC’s budget is funded by assessments paid by
national banks, and the biggest national banks pay the
highest assessments.117 The OCC recorded a 15 percent
111
Speech by Comptroller of the Currency John D. Hawke,
Jr. on Feb. 12, 2002 (emphasis added) (quoted in Wilmarth, supra note 34, at 236, 274).
112
Jess Bravin & Paul Beckett, Friendly Watchdog: Federal
Regulator Often Helps Banks Fighting Consumers, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 28, 2002, at A1 (quoting Mr. Hawke in part).
113
See Wilmarth, supra note 34, at 276 & n.201, and authorities cited therein.
114
Id. at 274-79, 289-93; Laura T. Osuri, ‘‘Trustmark of
Miss. Sticking with OCC,’’ American Banker, Sept. 20, 2004, at
5, 2004 WLNR 4060209 (reporting that J.P. Morgan Chase,
HSBC and Harris Bank had converted from state to national
charters in 2004).
115
Remarks by FDIC Chairman Donald E. Powell Before
the American Bankers Ass’n Annual Convention, Sept. 26,
2005, at 3 (available at www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/
chairman/spsept2605).
116
Id. at 1-2.
117
Under 12 C.F.R. § 8.2(a), the highest assessment rates
are paid by national banks with assets over $40 billion. See
also OCC Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2005, at 7 (reporting that
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increase in assessment revenues during its 2005 fiscal
year, and the OCC attributed a significant portion of
that increase to ‘‘new large banks joining the national
banking system.’’118
Thus, the OCC has a compelling financial incentive to
adopt preemptive regulations in order to attract large,
multistate banks and thereby enhance its financial resources. The OCC’s self-interest seems to be reflected in
its ‘‘relatively lax’’ and ‘‘unimpressive’’ record of enforcing consumer protection laws against national
banks, compared to the much more vigorous enforcement efforts of state authorities.119 In view of the OCC’s
financial and empire-building motivations for promulgating its preemption rules—including 12 C.F.R.
§ 7.4000(b)(2)—those rules should not be given any deference by the courts.120

2. Section 7.4000(b)(2) Conflicts with
Congressional Intent, as Shown by the
Text and History of 12 U.S.C. § 484(a)
and Related Statutes
The OCC’s attempt to bar state officials from seeking
judicial enforcement of state law is contrary to the text
and history of 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) and related statutes.
Section 484(a) was originally enacted as § 54 of the National Bank Act of 1864 (‘‘NBA’’). Section 54 authorized
the OCC to examine national banks and also provided
that national banks ‘‘shall not be subject to any other
visitorial powers than such as are authorized by this
act, except such as are vested in the several courts of law
and chancery.’’ Thus, the earliest version of § 484(a) provided the courts with explicit and unqualified authority
to exercise visitorial powers over national banks.
Section 53 of the NBA, presently codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 93(a), authorized the OCC to bring suit in federal
court to obtain a forfeiture of ‘‘all the rights, privileges,
and franchises of the [national banking] association’’ if
the directors of the bank knowingly violated the NBA or
permitted the bank’s officers, agents, or employees to
do so.122 In OCC v. Spitzer, the District Court concluded that § 53 supported the OCC’s claim of exclusive
authority to institute all types of judicial enforcement
proceedings against national banks.123 However, § 53
dealt only with court proceedings to obtain one type of
judicial remedy—viz., forfeiture of a national bank’s
97 percent of the OCC’s operations are funded by ‘‘seminannual assessments levied on national banks’’); id. at 62 (stating
that ‘‘the percentage of total OCC assets attributable to large
banks increased from 82.4 percent to 85.6 percent’’ during its
2005 fiscal year).
118
OCC Annual Report, Fiscal Year, 2005, at 62 & tbl. 9 (reporting that the OCC’s assessment revenues rose from $482.3
million in fiscal year 2004 to $557.8 million in fiscal year 2005).
119
Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and Predatory
Lending: Unmasking the Deregulatory Agenda 78 TEMPLE L.
REV. 1, 70-74, 77-81 (2005) (quote at 81); Wilmarth, supra note
34, at 232 (quote), 306-16, 348-56.
120
Wilmarth, supra note 34, at 232, 276-78, 293-98; see also
Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron Deference and Agency SelfInterest, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 203, 208-11, 262-73,
282-87 (2004); Peterson, supra note 119, at 70-74, 77-84.
Act of June 3, 1864, c. 106, § 54, 13 Stat. 116 (emphasis
added).
122
Id. § 53, 13 Stat. 116.
123
OCC v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 394.
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charter for violations of federal law. Section 53 did not
refer to causes of action for other types of judicial remedies against national banks, nor did § 53 contain any
explicit prohibition against court suits by state officials
to enforce state laws.
Section 57 of the NBA provided that ‘‘suits, actions,
and proceedings’’ against a national bank could be
brought in federal court or in ‘‘any state, county, or municipal court in the county or city in which such
[national bank] is located, having jurisdiction in similar
cases.’’124 The only exception from § 57’s general grant
of concurrent jurisdiction to state courts was that federal courts would have exclusive jurisdiction over ‘‘all
proceedings to enjoin the [OCC].’’125 In a 1917 decision,
the Supreme Court found that § 57 provided a strong indication of Congress’ intent to allow state officials to obtain judicial remedies from state courts for the purpose
of enforcing state laws against national banks.126 That
decision has never been overruled.
The provisions of §§ 53, 54 and 57 of the NBA were
carried forward into §§ 5198, 5239, 5240, and 5241 of
the Revised Statutes. Section 5198 (as amended in
1875) incorporated the jurisdictional provisions of § 57
of the NBA.127 Section 5239 incorporated the provisions
of § 53 of the NBA, authorizing the OCC to file suit in
federal court to revoke a national bank’s charter for violations of the NBA. Sections 5240 and 5241 incorporated, respectively, the OCC’s examination powers and
the limitation on visitorial powers ‘‘other than such
as . . . are vested in the courts of justice’’, as originally
provided in § 54 of the NBA. Ultimately, the same provisions were codified in 12 U.S.C. §§ 93(a), 94 (until its
partial repeal in 1982), 481 and 484(a).
Congress passed additional statutes in 1882, 1887
and 1888 to regulate the jurisdiction of federal and state
courts over national banks. Those statutes were ultimately codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1348. Section 1348 gives
federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over actions by federal officials to wind up the affairs of a national bank or
actions by a national bank to enjoin the OCC or any receiver acting under the OCC’’s direction.
However, § 1348 also provides that national banks
‘‘shall, for the purpose of all other actions by or against
them, be deemed citizens of the States in which they are
respectively located.’’128 Thus, under § 1348, national
banks are subject to suit in state courts unless they can
establish either diversity jurisdiction or federal question
jurisdiction.129
In 1982, Congress repealed a portion of 12 U.S.C.
§ 94.130 The repealed portion—derived from § 57 of the
original NBA and Rev. Stat. § 5198—provided that a national bank could be sued in state or local courts only in
the county or city in which the national bank was ‘‘lo124

Act of June 3, 1864, c. 106, § 57, 13 Stat. 116-17.
Id., 13 Stat. 117.
First National Bank of Bay City v. Fellows, 244 U.S. 416,
428 (1917).
127
See Mercantile National Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S.
520, 527-28 (1963) (app.); First National Bank of Charlotte v.
Morgan, 132 U.S. 141, 144-45 (1889).
128
12 U.S.C. § 1348 (emphasis added). In Wachovia Bank,
N.A. v. Schmidt, No. 04-1186 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2006), the Supreme
Court held that a national bank is ‘‘located,’’ for purposes of
§ 1348, only in the state where it maintains its main office.
129
See Langdeau, 371 U.S. at 526-27, 528-29 (app.); Continental National Bank v. Buford, 191 U.S. 119, 123-24 (1903).
130
Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 406, 96 Stat. 1512.
125
126
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cated.’’131 The purpose of the 1982 repeal was to make
clear that, except for cases dealing with national bank
receiverships, ‘‘judicial venue [in cases involving national banks] will lie in the appropriate federal, state or
local court, as determined by other general venue statutes.’’132
Thus, Congress has consistently manifested its intent
to make national banks subject to suit in state courts to
the same extent as other citizens of the states in which
such banks are ‘‘located,’’ except for (i) suits by the
OCC to revoke a national bank’s charter or to wind up
the affairs of a national bank, or (ii) suits to enjoin the
OCC or a receiver acting under the OCC’s direction.
Congress never expressed a specific intent to bar
state officials from bringing judicial proceedings to enforce state laws against national banks in §§ 53, 54 and
57 of the original NBA, or in §§ 5198, 5239, 5240 and
5241 of the Revised Statutes, or in 12 U.S.C. §§ 93(a),
94, 484(a) and 1348. In the absence of any express
statement of congressional intent, it must be presumed
that Congress did not intend to divest the states of their
sovereign authority to enforce their laws by bringing judicial proceedings against national banks. Such a presumption is consistent with (1) the Supreme Court’s
recognition that each state has ‘‘the power, inherent in
any sovereign, independently to determine what shall
be an offense against its authority and to punish such
offenses,’’133 and (2) the Court’s admonition that
‘‘[u]nless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will
not be deemed to have significantly changed the
federal-state balance.’’134

District Court’s Misplaced Reliance on 12 U.S.C.
§ 36(f)(1)(B)

In OCC v. Spitzer, the District Court found support
for the OCC’s regulation in 12 U.S.C. § 36(f)(1)(B), a
statute enacted in 1994 as part of the Riegle-Neal Act.
Under § 36(f)(1)(B), host state laws that apply to interstate branches of national banks ‘‘shall be enforced’’ by
the OCC.135 However, for two reasons, § 36(f)(1)(B)
does not support either the OCC’s rule or the District
Court’s decision. First, the legislative history of
§ 36(f)(1(B) indicates that Congress intended to give the
OCC exclusive authority to make examinations of interstate branches of national banks and to bring ‘‘supervisory’’ (i.e., administrative) enforcement actions against
such branches. That legislative history does not include
any explicit reference to judicial proceedings.136
Second, the House-Senate conferees on the RiegleNeal Act expressed their great concern with maintaining ‘‘the balance of Federal and State law under the
131
See Citizens & Southern National Bank v. Bougas, 434
U.S. 35, 35-36, 41-42 (1977).
132
S. Rep. No. 97-536, at 28 (1982) (emphasis added), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3054, 3081.
133
Heath, 474 U.S. at 89 (quoting Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 320).
134
Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 173 (quoting United
States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)).
135
OCC v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 402-03 (quoting 12
U.S.C. § 36(f)(1)(B)).
136
See 130 Cong. Rec. S12786 (daily ed., Sept. 13, 1994)
(colloquy between Senators D’Amato and Riegle). See also
First Union v. Burke, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 146 (stating that the
text and legislative history of § 36(f)(1)(B) are ‘‘consistent’’
with the view that the OCC possesses ‘‘exclusive administrative
enforcement authority’’ over national banks) (emphasis
added).
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dual banking system.’’137 The conferees emphasized
that ‘‘Congress does not intend that the [Riegle-Neal
Act] alter this balance and thereby weaken States’ authority to protect the interests of their consumers, businesses, or communities.’’138 In First Union v. Burke, the
district court concluded, after reviewing the text and
legislative history of the Riegle-Neal Act, that ‘‘the regulatory structure of Section 36(f)(1)(B) reflects Congressional intent that the existing regulatory scheme remain
unchanged.’’139 Thus, there is no evidence indicating
that § 36(f)(1)(B) was intended to change ‘‘the balance
of Federal and State law’’ by weakening the states’ enforcement authority as it existed in 1994 under the
‘‘vested in the courts of justice’’ clause of 12 U.S.C.
§ 484(a).
Moreover, the Riegle-Neal Act did not repeal or
amend the ‘‘vested in the courts of justice’’ clause of
§ 484(a). Given the strong presumption against implied
repeals of federal statutes, § 36(f)(1)(B) cannot reasonably be construed as having repealed by implication the
authority of state officials to initiate judicial enforcement proceedings under the ‘‘vested in the courts of justice’’ clause of § 484(a).140
Congress also did not express any intent in the
Riegle-Neal Act to overturn the numerous court
decisions—discussed in the next section—which have
upheld the states’ authority to institute judicial enforcement proceedings against national banks. Indeed, the
House-Senate conferees expressed their general agreement with existing court decisions governing the application of state laws to national banks. The conferees
noted with approval that ‘‘[c]ourts generally use a rule
137
H.R. Rep. No. 103-651, at 53 (1994) (Conf. Rep.) (emphasis added), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2068, 2074.
138
Id. A separate provision of the Riegle-Neal Act, codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 43, further manifests the intent of Congress to
preserve the federal-state balance in the dual banking system
that existed in 1994. Section 43 requires a federal banking
agency to follow notice-and-comment procedures whenever it
intends to issue a preemption ruling with regard to state laws
in the areas of community reinvestment, consumer protection,
fair lending, and establishment of intrastate branches. The
House-Senate conferees emphasized that the notice-andcomment process mandated by § 43 was intended to help
maintain the balance between federal and state authority over
national banks that existed in 1994:
This process is not intended to confer upon the [federal]
agency any new authority to preempt or to determine preemptive Congressional intent in the four areas described, or to
change the substantive theories of preemption as set forth in
existing law. Rather, it is intended to help focus any administrative preemption analysis and to help ensure that any agency
only makes a preemption determination when the legal basis
is compelling and the Federal policy interest is clear.
H.R. Rep. No. 103-651, supra, at 55 (emphasis added), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2076.
139
First Union v. Burke, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 146 (emphasis
added).
140
See Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981) (holding
that ‘‘repeals by implication are not favored . . . The intention
of the legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest’’) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Morton v. Mancari, 434 U.S. 535, 549-51 ((1974) (refusing to conclude that a
1934 statute was repealed by implication in a 1972 statute, because (i) the argument for implied repeal relied only on ‘‘congressional silence’’, (ii) ‘‘[t]here is nothing in the legislative
history . . . that indicates affirmatively any congressional intent
to repeal the 1934 [statute],’’ and (iii) there was no showing
that ‘‘the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable’’).
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of construction that avoids finding a conflict between
the Federal and State law where possible. The [RiegleNeal Act] does not change these judicially established principles.’’141

3. The Courts Have Repeatedly Upheld
the States’ Authority to Enforce Their
Laws by Bringing Judicial Proceedings
Against National Banks
Section 7.4000(b)(2) is contrary to a series of cases
decided since 1870, in which the courts have allowed
state officials to obtain judicial remedies to prevent or
punish violations of state laws by national banks. In National Bank v. Commonwealth of Kentucky,142 Kentucky filed suit in state court to force a national bank to
comply with a state law requiring each bank to pay, on
behalf of its shareholders, the state tax due on their
shares. The Supreme Court upheld a state court judgment that ordered the national bank to pay the state tax
owed by its shareholders. In doing so, the Supreme
Court declared:
‘‘[W]hile Congress intended to limit State taxation to
the shares of the bank, as distinguished from its capital,
. . . it did not intend to prescribe to the States the mode
in which the tax should be collected. . . . It is not to be
readily inferred, therefore, that Congress intended to
prohibit this mode of collecting a tax which they expressly permitted the States to levy.’’143
Thus the Court did not question the authority of Kentucky officials to institute a state court proceeding to enforce the state’s tax law against the national bank.
Similarly, in Waite v. Dowley,144 the Supreme Court
affirmed a state court judgment imposing a civil money
penalty on a national bank’s cashier. The cashier had
refused to comply with a Vermont law requiring him to
provide a list of the national bank’s shareholders (and
the amounts paid for their stock) to the treasurer of the
town in which the bank was located. The Court held
that ‘‘[s]ome legislation of Vermont was . . . necessary
to the proper exercise of the rightful [taxing] powers of
the State, and, so far as it required this list, was not in
conflict with any provision of the act of Congress.’’145
Again, the Court did not question the authority of the
town treasurer to enforce Vermont’s law by filing suit in
a state court.
In Guthrie v. Harkness,146 a shareholder of national
bank filed suit in a Utah state court to enforce his
common-law right to inspect the bank’s books and
records. The Utah court ordered the bank to permit inspection, finding that the shareholder’s demand was
made, in part, ‘‘for the purpose of ascertaining whether
the business affairs of the said bank have been conducted according to law.’’147
In affirming the state court’s decision, the Supreme
Court noted that a national bank is ‘‘subject by statute
141
H.R. Rep. No. 103-651, at 53 (1994) (Conf. Rep.) (emphasis added), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2074.
142
76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353 (1870).
143
Id. at 363.
144
94 U.S. 527 (1877).
145
Id. at 534.
146
199 U.S. 148 (1905).
147
Id. at 150 (quoting Utah trial court’s decision) (emphasis
added); see also id. at 155 (opinion of the Court).
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to be sued in the courts of the State.’’148 The Court also
observed that ‘‘visitorial powers’’ include actions taken
by ‘‘a superior or superintending officer who visits a
corporation to examine into its manner of conducting
business, and enforce an observance of its laws and
regulations.’’149 Thus, the Supreme Court made clear in
Guthrie that the term ‘‘visitorial powers’’ in § 484(a) refers primarily to examinations and enforcement proceedings involving national banks.
For two alternative reasons, the Court in Guthrie rejected the national bank’s claim that a shareholder inspection would violate the limitation on ‘‘visitorial powers’’ under Rev. Stat. § 5241, the precursor of 12 U.S.C.
§ 484(a). First, the Court held that the term ‘‘visitorial
powers’’ did not include the ‘‘private right of the shareholder’’ to exercise his inspection rights.150 Second, assuming arguendo that shareholder inspection rights
should be treated as a visitorial power, the Court explained that § 5241 provided ‘‘the full measure of visitorial power’’ over a national bank ‘‘[e]xcept in so far as
such corporation was liable to control in the courts of justice.’’151 The Court therefore concluded that § 5241 ‘‘did
not intend . . . to take away the right to proceed in courts
of justice to enforce such recognized rights as are here
involved.’’152

District Court’s Decision Not Supported by
Guthrie, Refuted by Bay City, St. Louis

In Guthrie the Supreme Court applied § 5241 in accordance with its plain terms. The Court confirmed that
national banks were ‘‘liable to control in the courts of
justice,’’ and the Court upheld the authority of federal
and state courts to enforce ‘‘recognized rights’’ against
national banks. Guthrie affirmed these principles in a
case where the plaintiff was seeking to determine
whether a national bank’s business was being ‘‘conducted according to law.’’ The plaintiff was a private
shareholder, not a state official.
Consequently, the District Court in OCC v. Spitzer
was clearly mistaken in inferring that the discussion of
§ 5241 in Guthrie was intended to question sub silentio
the authority of state officials to bring judicial enforcement proceedings against national banks.153 Any such
inference is plainly contradicted by the Supreme
Court’s previous decisions in National Bank of Commonwealth and Waite v. Dowley, which affirmed state
court judgments obtained by state officials to enforce
valid state laws against national banks. The Supreme
Court in Guthrie did not question the correctness of either decision, nor did the Court consider the authority
of state officials to initiate judicial enforcement proceedings.
Any doubts regarding the proper interpretation of the
‘‘vested in the courts of justice’’ clause of § 5241 were
removed by the Supreme Court’s subsequent decisions
in Bay City and St. Louis. In Bay City, the Court affirmed the authority of Michigan’s state attorney general to bring a quo warranto action in the Supreme
148

Id. at 157.
Id. at 158 (emphasis added) (quoting First National
Bank of Youngstown v. Hughes, 6 Fed. 737, 740 (C.C. N.D.
Ohio 1881, appeal dism’d, 106 U.S. 523 (1883)).
150
Id. at 158.
151
Id. at 159 (emphasis added).
152
Id. (emphasis added).
153
See OCC v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 400-01, 405-06.
149
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Court of Michigan against a national bank whose trust
business allegedly violated Michigan law.
The Court noted that the national bank’s trust activities involved ‘‘a business of a private nature’’ and, accordingly, ‘‘state regulations for the conduct of such
business, if not discriminatory or so unreasonable as to
justify the conclusion that they would necessarily so operate, would be controlling upon banks chartered by
Congress.’’154 The Court therefore held that state officials could sue national banks in state courts to stop
trust activities that violated valid state laws, particularly
since the governing federal statute prohibited national
banks from conducting a trust business ‘‘in contravention of state or local law.’’155 The Court found further
support for its conclusion in § 57 of the original NBA,
which made ‘‘controversies concerning national banks
cognizable in state courts because of their intimate relation to many state laws and regulations.’’156
In St. Louis the Supreme Court upheld the authority
of Missouri’s attorney general to bring a quo warranto
proceeding in the Supreme Court of Missouri to compel
a national bank to close a branch that violated Missouri’s antibranching law. The national bank and the
United States as amici curiae argued that federal law
completely preempted the authority of state officials to
bring judicial enforcement actions against national
banks.
Bank counsel and the Solicitor General contended
that the OCC had exclusive authority to bring judicial
proceedings against the national bank for violations of
law, in view of (1) Rev. Stat. § 5239, which allowed the
OCC to sue for forfeiture of a national bank’s charter
for violations of the NBA, and (2) Rev. Stat. 5241, which
limited the exercise of visitorial powers over national
banks. Bank counsel, the Solicitor General and three
dissenting members of the Court also maintained that
only the United States, as the chartering authority for
national banks, could bring a quo warranto proceeding
against a national bank.157
However, as discussed above, the Supreme Court in
St. Louis strongly affirmed the state attorney general’s
authority to enforce Missouri’s antibranching law by
means of a judicial proceeding. The Court stressed that
Missouri’s attorney general was seeking to enforce a
state statute, not any provision of the NBA, and the
Court upheld Missouri’s quo warranto proceeding as an
appropriate state remedy to enforce a valid state law
against the national bank:
‘‘The State is neither seeking to enforce a law of the
United States nor endeavoring to call the bank to account for an act in excess of its charter powers. What
the State is seeking to do is to vindicate and enforce its
own law, and the ultimate inquiry which it propounds is
whether the bank is violating that law . . . . Having de154
First National Bank in Bay City v. Fellows, 244 U.S. 416,
426 (1917).
155
Id. at 426-27 (referring to the precursor of 12 U.S.C.
§ 93a).
156
Id. at 428.
157
See First National Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri, 263
U.S. 640, 642-43 (1924) (argument by counsel for national
bank); id. at 645-48 (argument by counsel for the United
States); id. at 666-68 (Van Devanter, J., joined by Taft, C.J., and
Butler, J., dissenting). Justice Van Devanter and Justice Day
had previously dissented on similar grounds from the Court’s
decision in Bay City. See Bay City, 244 U.S. at 429-32 (Van
Devanter and Day, JJ., dissenting).
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termined that the power sought to be exercised finds no
justification in any law or authority of the United States,
the way is open for enforcement of the state statute.
‘‘The application of the state statute to the present case
and the power of the State to enforce it being established,
the nature of the remedy to be employed is a question for
state determination; and the judgment of the state court
that the one employed here was appropriate is conclusive, unless it involves a denial of due process of law,
which plainly it does not.’’158

Subsequent Decisions Affirmed States’ Authority
to Enforce State Laws Against National Banks
Since St. Louis, numerous federal and state courts
have confirmed the authority of state officials to sue in
federal and state courts to enforce valid state laws
against national banks. In several cases, courts have upheld the authority of state officials to enforce state laws
against national banks by means of suits for injunctive
relief, notwithstanding challenges raised by the OCC
and/or the defendant banks.159 In a number of other
cases, the courts have not questioned the power of state
officials to bring judicial actions for compulsory enforcement remedies against national banks.160
In National State Bank v. Long,161 the Third Circuit
held that 12 U.S.C. § 484 preempted the authority of
state officials to bring administrative actions for ceaseand-desist orders or civil money penalties against national banks. However, the Third Circuit did not consider or question the authority of state officials to enforce state laws against national banks through judicial
proceedings.
Subsequently, in First Union National Bank v.
Burke,162 the district court drew a sharp distinction between administrative and judicial enforcement proceedings. The district court agreed with the Third Circuit
that the OCC has exclusive authority to bring administra158
Id. at 660-61. The Supreme Court had previously upheld
a state quo warranto proceeding against due process and equal
protection challenges in Standard Oil Co v. Missouri, 224 U.S.
270 (1912).
159
E.g., Jackson v. First National Bank of Valdosta, 349
F.2d 71, 74-75 (5th Cir. 1965) (upholding a state banking commissioner’s authority to bring suit for injunctive relief); Nuesse
v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 699-705 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (granting, despite the OCC’s opposition, the motion of a state banking commissioner to intervene in a suit seeking injunctive relief); Missouri ex rel. Kostman v. First National Bank in St. Louis, 405
F.2d 733, 735 (E.D. Mo. 1975) (confirming a state banking
commissioner’s standing to file suit for injunctive relief), aff’d,
538 F.2d 219 (8th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 941
(1976); Colorado ex rel. State Banking Board, 540 F.2d 497,
498-99 (10th Cir. 1976) (rejecting the OCC’s challenge to the
standing of Colorado’s state banking board), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1091 (1977); Peoples Savings Bank v. Stoddard, 102
N.W.2d 777, 792-97 (Mich. 1960) (upholding a state attorney
general’s authority to bring a quo warranto action); Minnesota
by Lord v. First National Bank of St. Paul, 313 N.W.2d 390, 395
(Minn. 1981) (affirming a state treasurer’s enforcement authority), appeal dism’d, 456 U.S. 967 (1982).
160
E.g., Brown v. Clarke, 878 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1989); Mutschler v. Peoples National Bank of Washington, 607 F.2d 274
(9th Cir. 1979); New York by Abrams v. Citibank, N.A., 537
F. Supp. 1192 (S.D. N.Y. 1982); North Dakota v. Liberty National Bank & Trust Co., 427 N.W.2d 307 (N.D. 1988).
161
630 F.2d 981, 988-89 (3d Cir. 1980).
162
48 F. Supp. 2d 132 (D. Conn. 1999).
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tive enforcement actions against national banks.163
However, the district court also held—citing Bay City
and other cases cited above—that ‘‘a state may seek enforcement of its banking laws in either federal or state
court’’ pursuant to the ‘‘vested in the courts of justice’’
clause of § 484(a).164
In OCC v. Spitzer, the District Court held that the
OCC could disregard St. Louis as a controlling judicial
construction of 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) because ‘‘the actual
opinion of St. Louis did not mention or cite section 5241
of the Revised Statutes.’’165 That conclusion is clearly
erroneous. As noted above, the Supreme Court declared
in St. Louis that it would be a ‘‘fallacy’’ to acknowledge
‘‘the binding quality of a [state] statute but deny the
power of enforcement’’ to an authorized state official.166 Moreover, it would have been logically impossible for the Supreme Court to uphold the Missouri attorney general’s authority to bring a quo warranto proceeding without rejecting the arguments made by the
national bank’s counsel and the Solicitor General, who
vigorously asserted that the OCC had exclusive authority to bring judicial enforcement proceedings against
national banks under Rev. Stat. §§ 5239 and 5241.167
For two reasons, the District Court also erred in finding that Chevron permitted the OCC to adopt an interpretation of § 484(a) that was contrary to St. Louis.168
First, as demonstrated above, the OCC’s interpretation
does not qualify for deference under Chevron. Second,
even if Chevron applies, the Supreme Court has held
that a federal agency is bound by a prior judicial interpretation of a statute ‘‘if the prior court holding ‘determined a statute’s clear meaning.’ ’’169 As demonstrated
above, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bay City and
St. Louis —as well as subsequent decisions of lower federal courts and state courts—clearly establish that the
‘‘vested in the courts of justice’’ clause of § 484(a) does
permit state officials to initiate judicial proceedings to
enforce state laws against national banks. Moreover,
those judicial decisions—unlike 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(b)(2)
—are consistent with the plain, common-sense meaning
of the language used by Congress. In such circumstances, Chevron does not allow the OCC to disregard
these authoritative judicial constructions.
In OCC v. Spitzer, the District Court was also mistaken in describing as ‘‘dicta’’ the careful distinction
drawn in First Union v. Burke between administrative
and judicial enforcement of state laws against national
163

See id. at 143-50.
Id. at 145-46.
165
OCC v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 395.
166
St. Louis, 263 U.S. at 660; see also supra note 78 and accompanying text.
167
See St. Louis, 263 U.S. at 642-43 (argument of bank
counsel); id. at 645-48 (argument of the Solicitor General). See
also McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 179-80 (1991) (holding
that a legal argument was ‘‘implicitly reject[ed]’’ in a previous
Supreme Court decision because that argument, if accepted,
would have made it ‘‘quite unnecessary’’ for the Court to ‘‘establish’’ the ‘‘rule’’ contained in its earlier decision).
168
OCC v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 396 n.8.
169
Nat’l Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2701 (2005) (emphasis in original) (quoting Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel,
Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 131 (1990)). See also id. (explaining that ‘‘a
court’s prior interpretation of a statute [will] override an agency’s interpretation only if the relevant court decision held the
statute unambiguous’’).
164
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banks.170 In First Union v. Burke, as previously shown,
the court’s discussion of the states’ authority to enforce
state laws by means of judicial proceedings was not
dicta, but was instead a crucial premise on which the
court based its decision to dismiss Connecticut’s Tenth
Amendment claim.171
The District Court in OCC v. Spitzer further argued
that the distinction drawn in Burke between administrative and judicial enforcement proceedings was ‘‘rejected’’ in two subsequent district court decisions.172
However, the District Court ignored the important fact
that, as discussed above, the opinion in Burke (i) contained an extensive and persuasive analysis of the text
and history of § 484(a) and (ii) was consistent with prior
judicial decisions. In contrast the two decisions cited in
OCC v. Spitzer did not include any comparable analysis
and cannot be reconciled with Bay City, St. Louis and
other court decisions reviewed above.173

Congress Implicitly Endorsed Decisions Allowing
States to Seek Enforcement Against National
Banks

Finally, the District Court overlooked the significance
of Congress’ reenactment of the ‘‘vested in the courts of
justice’’ clause in 1982, without any change. In 1982,
Congress amended 12 U.S.C. § 484 by adding a new
provision, codified as § 484(b). Section 484(b) authorizes state officials to examine the records of a national
bank ‘‘solely to ensure compliance with applicable State
unclaimed property or escheat laws upon reasonable
cause to believe that the bank has failed to comply with
such laws.’’174 Section 484(b) does not address the authority of state officials to bring judicial enforcement
proceedings; it deals only with their right to examine national bank records for the specified purpose.175 In the
same 1982 statute, Congress reenacted the original
§ 484—including the ‘‘vested in the courts of justice’’
clause—without making any changes. The original
§ 484 was recodified as § 484(a).176
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that ‘‘Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or
judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without
170

OCC v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 396 n.9.
See First Union v. Burke, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 148-49, 151;
supra notes 79-83, 162-64 and accompanying text (discussing
Burke).
172
OCC v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 405 n.12 (citing Bank
One Delaware NA v. Wilens, 2003 WL 21703629 (C.D. Cal. July
7, 2003), and Goleta National Bank v. O’Donnnell, 239
F. Supp. 2d 745 (S.D. Ohio 2002)).
173
See Bank One v. Wilens, 2003 WL 21703629 at *1-*2)
(concluding, without any detailed analysis, that plaintiff could
not bring a ‘‘private attorney general’’ suit against a national
bank, in view of 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000 and the OCC’s interpretation of the ‘‘vested in the courts of justice’’ clause of § 484(a));
Goleta v. O’Donnell, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 757 (declaring, without any analysis, that § 484(a) and 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000 prohibit
state officials from bringing either administrative or judicial
enforcement actions against national banks).
174
Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 412, 96 Stat. 1521 (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 484(b)).
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See S. Rep. No. 97-536, at 29, 62 (1982) (explaining the
scope and purpose of § 484(b)), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3054, 3082, 3115.
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Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 412, 96 Stat. 1521 (codified as 12
U.S.C. § 484(a)).
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change.’’177 By 1982, as shown above, the Supreme
Court and other federal and state courts had consistently upheld the authority of state officials to bring judicial proceedings to enforce state laws against national
banks—a result that was consistent with the unqualified
terms of the ‘‘vested in the courts of justice’’ clause.
In contrast, the OCC’s regulations in 1982 did not include any interpretation of that clause. In fact, the OCC
‘‘acquiesced’’ in 1999 to the interpretation of the
‘‘vested in the courts of justice’’ clause in First Union v.
Burke, an interpretation that was faithful to Bay City
and other judicial decisions.178 The OCC did not put
forward its current interpretation barring judicial enforcement by state officials until 2003, when it published notice of its proposal to adopt 12 C.F.R.
§ 7.4000(b)(2).179 Given those circumstances, Congress’
reenactment of the ‘‘vested in the courts of justice’’
clause in 1982 must be viewed as an implicit congressional endorsement of prior court decisions upholding
the right of state officials to obtain judicial enforcement
of state laws against national banks.

4. The OCC’s Limited Rulemaking Power
Under 12 U.S.C. § 93a Did Not Give the
OCC Authority to Adopt 12 C.F.R.
§ 7.4000(b)(2)
In OCC v. Spitzer, the District Court further erred by
holding that 12 U.S.C. § 93a provided the OCC with
supplemental
authority
to
adopt
12
C.F.R.
§ 7.4000(b)(2).180 Under 12 U.S.C. § 93a, the OCC may
issue regulations ‘‘to carry out the responsibilities of the
office.’’ When § 93a was enacted in 1980, Congress
made clear that the OCC does not have authority thereunder to expand the statutory powers of national banks:
‘‘[Section 93a] is only available to carry out the responsibilities of the [OCC] and carries with it no new authority to confer on national banks powers which they do
not have under existing substantive law. To give national
banks authority under this rulemaking provision that
they do not possess under existing substantive law
would not be carrying out the responsibilities of the
[OCC] since only Congress can define those responsibilities so as to confer powers on national banks.’’181
177
Lindahl v. OPM, 470 U.S. 768, 782 n.15 (1985) (quoting
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978)).
178
OCC v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 399-400, 404-05 (discussing regulations adopted by the OCC under § 484 between
1971 and 2004, and pointing out that ‘‘[t]he OCC acknowledges that its current interpretation of the courts of justice exception is inconsistent with the position it acquiesced to in First
Union Nat’l Bank v. Burke’’) (emphasis added). See also supra
notes 79-83, 162-64 and accompanying text (discussing
Burke).
179
Id. at 400 (describing the OCC’s proposal to adopt 12
C.F.R. § 7.4000(b)(2) in 2003, and its adoption of that rule in
2004).
180
Id. at 398.
181
126 Cong. Rec. 6902 (1980) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire,
Senate floor manager for the 1980 legislation) (emphasis
added). See also H.R. Rep. No. 96-842, at 83 (1980) (Conf.
Rep.), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 298, 313 (stating that
§ 93a ‘‘carries with it no authority to permit otherwise impermissible activities of national banks with specific reference to
the provisions of the McFadden Act and the Glass-Steagall
Act’’).
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In Conference of State Bank Supervisors v.
Conover,182 the D.C. Circuit explained that (i) § 93a
‘‘grants no new substantive powers to [national]
banks’’; and (ii) § 93a allows the OCC to preempt state
laws only ‘‘[s]o long as [the OCC] does not authorize
activities that run afoul of federal laws governing the
activities of national banks.’’183 Subsequently, the same
court confirmed that ‘‘[n]ational banks, being creatures
of statute, possess only those powers conferred upon them
by Congress.’’184 The court therefore struck down an
OCC ruling that expanded the powers of national banks
beyond the limits established by Congress.185
In view of the limited rulemaking power granted by
§ 93a, the OCC had no authority to issue a regulation
barring the states from exercising their sovereign authority to bring judicial enforcement proceedings
against national banks. The OCC’s ‘‘interpretation’’
contained in 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(b)(2) is contradicted by
the unqualified terms of the ‘‘vested in the courts of justice’’ of 12 U.S.C. § 484(a), as well as its history and judicial application. As the D.C. Circuit has observed, ‘‘a
dramatic rewriting of the statute is not mere interpretation.’’186
In Gonzalez v. Oregon, the Supreme Court held that
21 U.S.C. § 871(b) did not give the Attorney General a
‘‘broad authority to promulgate rules’’ because the statute only authorized him to issue regulations ‘‘which he
may deem necessary and appropriate for the efficient
execution of his functions under this [Act}.’’187 The Attorney General’s power to issue rules to execute his
‘‘functions’’ under § 871(b) is essentially the same as
the OCC’s authority to issue regulations to ‘‘carry out
[its] responsibilities’’ under 12 U.S.C. § 93a.
The Supreme Court drew a sharp distinction in
Gonzalez between the limited terms of § 871(b) and the
much broader language of statutes that authorize agencies to adopt rules ‘‘in the public interest to carry out
the provisions’’ of a statute or ‘‘to effectuate the purposes of’’ the statute.188 In view of § 871(b)’s limited
scope, the Court concluded that the Attorney General
could not ‘‘define the substantive standards of medical
practice’’ in a manner that went ‘‘well beyond the
182

710 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
Id. at 885 (emphasis in original).
184
Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Hawke, 211 F.3d 638,
640 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (emphasis added) (citing, inter alia, Texas
& Pac. Ry. Co v. Pottorff, 291 U.S. 245, 253 (1934)).
185
Id. at 643-45.
186
ABA v. FTC, 430 F.3d at 470.
187
Gonzalez v. Oregon, No. 04-623 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2006), slip
op. at 12 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 871(b)).
188
Id., slip op. at 11-12 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) and 15
U.S.C. § 1604(a)).
183
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[CSA’s] specific grants of authority.’’189 For the same
reason, 12 U.S.C. § 93a did not authorize the OCC to
adopt 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(b)(2), because that regulation
changes the substantive meaning and scope of the
‘‘vested in the courts of justice’’ clause in a way that
conflicts with the ‘‘plain language of the [statutory]
text.’’190
Similarly, in Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin.
Corp.,191 the Supreme Court struck down a regulation
of the Federal Reserve Board that attempted to redefine
the statutory definition of ‘‘bank’’ in § 2(c) of the Bank
Holding Company Act (‘‘BHC Act’’).192 As it did in
Gonzalez, the Supreme Court declared that a federal
agency cannot expand the limits of its authority by disregarding the ‘‘plain language’’ of the governing statute.193
The Court also rejected the Board’s attempt to rely on
its rulemaking power under § 5(b) of the BHC Act.194
The Court held that ‘‘§ 5 only permits the Board to police within the boundaries of the [BHC] Act; it does not
permit the Board to expand its jurisdiction beyond the
boundaries established by Congress.’’195 For the same
reason, 12 U.S.C. § 93a does not authorize the OCC to
redraw the boundary line that Congress has clearly established in 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) between (i) the OCC ‘s
exclusive authority to bring administrative enforcement
proceedings against national banks, and (ii) the authority of federal and state courts to entertain suits against
national banks by federal and state officials and private
parties pursuant to the ‘‘vested in the courts of justice’’
clause.

Conclusion

OCC v. Spitzer represents a fundamental misapplication of the Chevron doctrine and should be reversed.
The District Court improperly upheld an OCC regulation that (i) disregards the plain meaning of the ‘‘vested
189

Id., slip op. at 17-18.
Id., slip op. at 18.
191
474 U.S. 361 (1986).
192
12 U.S.C. § 1841(c).
193
Dimension, 474 U.S. at 373-74; see also id. at 368 (holding that ‘‘[t]he traditional deference courts pay to agency interpretation is not to be applied to alter the clearly expressed intent of Congress’’).
194
12 U.S.C. § 1844(b).
195
Dimension, 474 U.S. at 373 n.6.
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in the courts of justice’’ clause of 12 U.S.C. § 484(a),
and (ii) purports to overturn more than a century of judicial decisions affirming the right of state officials to
file court suits to enforce state laws against national
banks.
Unless OCC v. Spitzer is reversed, the OCC is likely
to continue its trend of preempting state laws in any
area where Congress has not explicitly forbidden the
OCC to act. The OCC’s preemption campaign may serve
the interests of large, multistate banks whose allegiance
the OCC wants to preserve or attract. However, the
OCC’s preemption efforts—unless stopped by the
courts or Congress—will continue to undermine the
dual banking system, impair state sovereignty, and
greatly weaken the protections provided by state laws
to consumers of financial services.196
In view of the recent decisions by the Supreme Court
in Gonzalez v. Oregon and by the D.C. Circuit in ABA v.
FTC, the District Court clearly failed to apply a crucial
precondition
for
Chevron
deference.
That
precondition—which I call ‘‘Chevron step 2.1’’—
requires a reviewing court to determine whether Congress intended to delegate the full extent of rulemaking
authority claimed by the federal agency, particularly
where the agency seeks to expand its jurisdiction or to
infringe upon a sovereign state power.
Unless courts apply ‘‘Chevron step 2.1’’ in future decisions involving OCC regulations, the OCC will enjoy a
‘‘virtually limitless hegemony’’ as long as Congress fails
to enact statutes that ‘‘expressly negate’’ the OCC’s ability to act.197 Such an outcome would be contrary to the
teachings of Gonzalez v. Oregon and ABA v. FTC.
Moreover, it would vitiate what I have always believed
to be the most important principle of administrative
law—namely, that ‘‘[t]he rulemaking power granted to
an administrative agency is not the power to make law.
Rather, it is the power to adopt regulations to carry into
effect the will of Congress as expressed in the
[governing] statute.’’198
196

See generally Wilmarth, supra note 34.
ABA v. FTC, 430 F.3d at 468 (emphasis in original)
(quoting Ry. Labor Exec. Ass’n, 29 F.3d at 671).
198
Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977)
(emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213-14 (1976)).
197

COPYRIGHT ! 2006 BY THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., WASHINGTON, D.C.

BBR

ISSN 0891-0634

